Market Size and Vertical Equilibrium in the Context of Successive Cournot Oligopolies by Dufeu, Ivan
Market Size and Vertical Equilibrium in the Context of
Successive Cournot Oligopolies
Ivan Dufeu
To cite this version:
Ivan Dufeu. Market Size and Vertical Equilibrium in the Context of Successive Cournot
Oligopolies. B.E. Journal in Theoretical Economics, Topics in Theoretical Economics, 2004, 4
(1), pp.article 2. <hal-00581571>
HAL Id: hal-00581571
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00581571
Submitted on 31 Mar 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accepté dans Topics in Theoretical Economics, revue à comité de lecture de la série 
« Berkeley Journals of Theoretical Economics», référencée JEL et Econlit. 
 
 Abstract : This paper illustrates the effect of market size on the decision of 
whether or not firms should vertically integrate or disintegrate. We use a model of 
two successive stages of production with Cournot competition in each stage. In 
this model, firms choose to specialize (either upstream or downstream) or to 
integrate the two stages, before making their production decisions. The decision of 
whether or not to integrate or specialize depend on the trade-off between “escaping 
from” the double marginalization problem or the gain from specializing on the 
production stage in which the firm is more efficient. We show (using simulations) 
that more firms choose to be vertically integrated as the valuation of the final 
product or the number of consumers increase, unless the number of firms increases 
proportionately.  
 
JEL Classification : D43 ; L13 ; L22  
 
Keywords : vertical integration, vertical equilibrium, industry growth, successive 
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1. Introduction 
 
Existing economic theories have provided little analysis of vertical disintegration 
while focusing on integration. This is surprising as Adam Smith indirectly mentioned 
the issue in his analysis of the division of labor. Actually, the few contributions to 
vertical disintegration are built on Adam Smith’s proposition that the division of 
labor is limited by the extent of the market (Young (1928), Pigou (1932), Stigler 
(1951)). In applying Smith's theorem, Stigler (1951) argued that vertical 
disintegration is the typical evolution of a growing industry, whereas a declining 
industry must be characterized by vertical integration. Stigler offers a testable 
proposition, regarding industry growth and vertical integration. His vertical 
separation argument is that as the market demand for an industry’s product increases, 
it is more economic for the firms in the industry to purchase some of their inputs from 
specialized firms, who can reap economies of scale from large scale operation. 
Conversely, as the industry demand falls, firms will produce in-house inputs that 
were formerly outsourced. In other words, vertical disintegration is the typical 
evolution of an industry in growth, while vertical integration that of an industry in 
decline.  
The following empirical research is investigating the validity of Stigler’s 
proposition. Tucker and Wilder (1977) examined 54 American manufacturing firms, 
and Levy (1984) explored census data for 38 industries from 1963, 1967 and 1972 : 
they found some support to Stigler’s conjecture. Subsequently, Wright and Thompson 
(1986) tested Stigler’s hypothesis with data on 407 investment withdrawals in the UK 
between 1977 and 1979. They showed that vertical disintegration is positively 
correlated with industry growth. By contrast, Stuckey (1983) found opposite results 
from the study of the aluminum industry. Thus, the results are inconclusive. 
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In this paper, we construct a model of vertical equilibrium allowing theoretical 
examination of Stigler’s hypothesis, within a framework of Cournot competition. We 
examine equilibria where integrated and specialized firms coexist, and we confront 
the vertical equilibrium to modifications of the market size.  
In this context of successive Cournot oligopolies, Salinger (1988) shows, in a 
two stages model with fixed proportions, that vertical integration can result from the 
double mark-up effect. But he simply imposes the coexistence of integrated and 
specialized firms, without studying the integration game. Gaudet and Van Long 
(1996) do examine the vertical equilibrium in a model of successive Cournot 
oligopolies and show that complete integration emerges in most circumstances. 
Depending on the number of firms at each stage, they show that there are few 
complete disintegration equilibria, and that only one specific configuration leads to 
the realistic coexistence of integrated and specialized firms. However, they don’t 
introduce the motivations of vertical disintegration1 : we believe that explains why 
vertical integration appears to be dominant in these models. So we do assume that 
there exist economies from specialization of the firms. 
Actually, as pointed out by White (1978), the dynamics of vertical integration-
disintegration cannot derive exclusively from the existence of economies of scale, 
contrary to what was suggested by Stigler (1951). If there are economies of scale for 
the production of an input, these cost savings could also be realized internally by the 
integrated firm. So, vertical disintegration comes from economies from performing a 
limited set of tasks, as opposed to economies from repeatedly performing any one 
activity. Perry (1984) do introduce economies from specialization, in a two stage 
model of vertical equilibrium with fixed proportions. These economies come from 
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1 Because their main purpose is to study foreclosure strategy at equilibrium and not really the vertical 
integration degree. 
final demand fluctuations which tend to increase profits of specialized firms relatively 
to integrated firms. He characterized a vertical equilibirum where upstream, 
downstream and integrated firms coexist. However, by explaining vertical integration 
from economies of synchronization, this model doesn’t allow to examine the 
relationship between vertical equilibrium and industry growth.  
Finally, Perry and Groff (1988) propose a vertical equilibrium model where 
vertical disintegration comes from differences in the firm’s competencies. In their 
model, each firm is endowed with a separate cost function for each stage, and the 
firms which are more efficient in upstream production are less efficient for the 
downstream production. They assume perfect competition downstream and imperfect 
competition at the upstream stage, which explains the benefits of vertical integration. 
For a given linear final demand, a vertical equilibrium can be defined, for which the 
firms make a choice between upstream or downstream specialization, and confronted 
to shifts in the demand size. They conclude that Stigler's hypothesis was verified only 
in specific circumstances.  
 
 Our paper is related to some extent to that of Perry (1984) and Perry and Groff 
(1988). We also introduce economies of specialization, to explain the coexistence of 
vertically integrated and vertically disintegrated firms2. We follow Perry and Groff 
(1988) for the main hypothesis of a continuum of agents with different skills. 
However, their assumption on competition is not well founded ; because of the 
limited total number of firms, it seems to be more logical to assume imperfect 
competition on each stage like in Gaudet and Van Long (1995). We also pose a 
simple linear final demand, and consider that firms compete in quantities after having 
decided whether to integrate both stages or not.  
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The model considers the presence of an exogenous number n of firms that 
play a two stage game. In the first stage, firms decide whether to specialise in either 
the upstream or the downstream production, or to be vertically integrated. In the 
second stage, upstream and downstream production decisions are taken by the firms 
that compete in quantities at both stages of production. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Assuming a linear final demand, 
section 4 characterizes the vertical equilibrium. This vertical equilibrium depends on 
horizontal oligopoly equilibrium at each stage of the process (section 3). Section 5 
tests Stigler's hypothesis through a simulation while analyzing the impact of a 
modification in the size of demand on the proportion of vertically integrated firms. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  The Model 
The model comprises two successive stages of production (an intermediate and a final 
one) and three types of producers : integrated, downstream and upstream firms. An 
integrated firm produces both the final good and the intermediate good, with the latter 
used as an input in the production of the final good. An upstream firm produces only 
the intermediate good, while a downstream firm produces the final good and buys the 
intermediate good on the open market. The firms produce with fixed-coefficient 
technology : one unit of the intermediate good is required to produce one unit of the 
final good. Lastly, each firm can choose to operate in one or both of the two stages. 
The firms differ in their efficiency in producing intermediate and final goods. 
We assume this not only because it is usually observed in reality (see Gaudet and al. 
(1996) for the world oil industry), but also because skills and specialization choices 
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2 So the issue here is based on a different model that of Stigler (1951) or White (1978) who predict that 
all firms will become more integrated or less integrated as the market increases. 
are closely correlated and because these differences of skills explain diseconomies of 
vertical scope. Following Perry and Groff (1988), we assume that firms that are more 
efficient in downstream production are less efficient in upstream production, and vice 
versa. Efficiency is defined as lower total costs for producing all outputs levels. We 
pose, as they do, a cost parameter θ  specific for every firm, where 0 , such that 
firms with a 
1≤≤θ
θ  near one have a relative advantage in upstream technology, whereas 
firms with a small ϑ  have a relative advantage in downstream technology. Industry is 
composed of an exogenous number of firms, . If  is not too large, every stage of 
the production process is characterized by an oligopoly : we assume Cournot 
competition. It is not possible in our model to permit free entry or exit of firms, nor 
horizontal integration, because only the most efficient firms would exist in 
equilibrium. We consider that the  firms, each characterized by a specific 
n n
n θ , are 
distributed on [0;1] so that the distance between two neighboring firms is constant for 
a given . Entry or exit can only be addressed by increasing or decreasing . All the 
firms have the information on the distribution of 
n n
θ . 
Every firm faces constant marginal costs and fixed costs (decreasing average 
costs). This assumption is not critical to our model and is compatible with the 
conjecture of Cournot competition. For the purposes of our research, we assume that 
θ  affects fixed costs. Had we assumed that θ  affects marginal costs the results of our 
story would have been the same, but the equations would have been much more 
complicated. So we consider that all firms have the same marginal cost for each 
stage, the difference in efficiency being reflected in fixed cost3.  
                                                 
 6
3 Perry and Groff (1988) assume that the average cost curves are increasing for downstream 
production, decreasing upstream and U-shaped for the integrated firms. It is not clear why to a given 
stage corresponds a given cost curve. So we choose not to consider that the form of the upstream and 
downtream costs curves differ. They also assume that the difference in efficiency is reflected in fixed 
cost for downstream and marginal cost for upstream production, which is not well motivated either. 
Let f be the fixed cost of the least efficient firm for downstream production 
( 1=θ ). We can then pose that fθ  is the downstream fixed cost of every other firm 
θ . With such a cost structure, the most efficient agent has no fixed cost ( 0=θ ) for 
downstream production. If  is the output of final good by firm θy θ and  the 
marginal cost for downstream production, its downstream total cost
c
4 is : 
 
θθθ θ ycfyC d ..)( +=     (1) 
 
In a similar way, let ϕ  be the fixed cost of the most efficient firm 1=θ  for 
upstream production. We can then define the upstream fixed cost of all other firms as 
θϕ / . If  is the output of intermediate good by firm θy θ , and χ  the marginal cost 
for upstream production, the total cost is : 
 
θθθ χθϕ yyC u += /)(     (2) 
 
We integrate neither economies nor diseconomies of vertical integration : both 
exist, but they are likely to compensate each other in practice. So we consider the 
total cost function of the integrated firms is the simple algebraic sum of the upstream 
and downstream costs. Thus, if  is the output of the final goods of an integrated 
firm 
θx
θ , its total cost is : 
θθθ χθϕθ xcfxC i ).(/.)( +++=         (3) 
   
On the demand side, we assume that the final consumers , with exogenous total 
number 
i
I , all behave the same way and have a linear individual demand function :  
pβαqi −=  
                                                 
4 The variable cost of buying intermediate goods will be  introduced into the profit function. 
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With y the aggregate final output of specialized firms and x that of integrated firms, 
the aggregate inverse demand function is :  
 
)
Iβ
yx(β/p(x,y) +−=α      (4) 
or, with βα /=a and )./(1 Ib β= ,   y)b(xap(x,y) +−=             (4bis) 
 
Growth in demand must mainly be captured by a rise in the number I of 
consumers, associated with a fall of . A rise of  (and of b a α ) corresponds with an 
increase in the value granted by each consumer to the final good5. It can therefore be 
regarded as a form of (indirect) growth of the market size. Modifying β raises no 
interesting question because it impacts simultaneously a and b. 
 
  To formalize Stigler's idea, we work on a vertical equilibrium which is defined 
by ( θθ , ), with 0 < θ  < θ  < 1. The firms with an index θ such as θθ <≤0   produce 
only the intermediate goods, the firms with an index θ such as θθθ <≤  are integrated, 
and the others are firms specialized in the downstream production. Theoretically this 
equilibrium can be defined if the oligopoly markups are significant. This will result of 
the firm's production choice (based on their relative profits) which depends on their 
index of efficiency. Because of the previous assumptions, the profits of the 
downstream firms must decrease when θ  increases and the profits of the upstream 
firms must increase. A firm highly qualified for the downstream (upstream) 
production will maximize its profit while specializing according to its comparative 
advantage although it undergoes the upstream (downstream) oligopoly mark-up. If a 
firm is fairly effective with both technologies (θ around 0.5), profit maximization can 
                                                 
5 This leads to a decrease in the price elasticity of consumption which is independent of I. 
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lead to an integration of the two stages, giving up the benefit of specialization (weak 
in it's situation) so as to avoid the double marginalization. To determine this vertical 
equilibrium, the horizontal equilibrium is characterized at each stage in section 3.  
 
3 .   Horizontal Equilibrium 
The Cournot horizontal equilibrium determines the profit-maximizing outputs for 
integrated firms, downstream firms and upstream firms. Let the number of firms and 
the demand size be such as : i) the final equilibrium price p* exceeds the marginal 
cost (which is also the variable average cost) of integrated firm ( )(* χ+> cp ); ii) the 
intermediate equilibrium price exceeds the marginal cost of upstream firms ( χ>*
cr
r
p
) ; 
iii) the final price p* exceeds the marginal cost of downstream firms ( +> ** ). 
Otherwise, some firms would not be profitable. 
 
3.1. OPTIMUM FOR INTEGRATED FIRMS 
 
The integrated firms must choose between two possibilities:  
- To withdraw intermediate market and to use all their intermediate production 
for their final production.  
- To take part in the intermediate market, by selling intermediate goods to the 
downstream firms, and/or buying these goods to the upstream firms.  
In our model, this choice depends on many circumstances. For an integrated firm, 
selling intermediate goods to the downstream firms can increase the scale of its 
upstream production, and thus reduce the upstream average cost (because of existence 
of a fixed cost). But, it introduces more competition upstream, and therefore lowers 
the intermediate price addressed to the downstream specialists who are direct 
competitors of integrated firms.  Buying intermediate goods to upstream specialists 
presents at opposite the advantage of increasing the price charged by the upstream 
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specialists and thus of degrading the competitiveness of downstream firms compares 
to integrated firms. However, that increases the provisioning price of the integrated 
firm (since it can produce at a marginal cost lower than the upstream market price), 
and that reduces the level of their in-house upstream production which increases the 
average upstream cost. 
 Gaudet and Long Van (1995) show that no general answer can be brought 
concerning these problems, even if one supposes very simple cost functions (constant 
marginal cost and not of fixed cost) and absence of competence differentiation. But 
according to Salinger (1988), it is especially in the presence of increasing average 
cost that the integrated firms can have sometimes interest to take part in the 
intermediate market.  
So let us pose that the integrated firms use all and only their intermediate 
output for their final production.  If  is the production of the integrated firm θ and 
if  is the total production of the other integrated firms (so we have ), 
θx
0x xxx =+ 0θ  
then the profit  function of the firm θ can be expressed as :  
 
ϕθχπ θθθθ −−+−+= fxcxyxxpi ).().,( 0  
The output firm θ  sets is : 
yxbcax −−−−= /)( χθ                   (5) 
 
Firms have the information on the distribution of firms on [0,1]. So they know 
that the number of integrated firms is simply ).( θθ −n , and that firms differ only in 
their fixed costs. This means that they know that each integrated firm θ  will produce 
the same output 
).( θθθ −= n
xx . So it comes : 
 
b
cay
n
)()
).(
1(1 χθθ
−−=+


−+x     (6) 
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This gives the output supplied by integrated firms given the output of 
specialized firms and the vertical equilibrium. 
 
3.2. OPTIMUM FOR DOWNSTREAM FIRMS 
 
If  is the production of the downstream firm dyθ θ  and if dy0  is the total production of 
the other downstream firms, then the downstream firm θ 's profit is :  
 
fycryxyypxyy ddddddd .).().,(),,( 00 θπ θθθθθ −+−+=    (7) 
 
Firms know that the number of downstream firms is simply θ.n  and that each 
downstream firm θ  will produce the same output θθ .n
yy d = . Considering the first 
order condition from (7), and substituting for p(x,y), equation (8) defines the inverse 
demand function of the intermediate good for each upstream firm : 
)yθnb(b.xcar(y,x)
11+−−−=     (8) 
 
3.3 OPTIMUM FOR UPSTREAM FIRMS 
 
If  is the production of the upstream firm uyθ θ  and if uy 0  is the total production of the 
other upstream firms, then the profit function of the upstream firm θ is :  
θϕχπ θθθθθ /).,(),( 00 −−+=+ uuuuuuu yyxyyrxyy   (9) 
 Each upstream firm produces )1/( θ−y . Substituting for  from (7) and 
maximizing, we have :  
),( yxr
)()11(1
)1(
1 χθθ −−=++

 +− caxbynnb    (10) 
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3.4 HORIZONTAL COMPLETE EQUILIBRIUM 
 
Conditions (6) and (10), simultaneously define the equilibrium outputs  and  
given the vertical boundaries(
*x *y
θθ , ). Let's normalize to unity the cost parameters c 
and χ , which raise no interesting questions and don't impact our conclusions. 
 
]1))1(²(²[
)())1(1()2(*
nnb
nanx ++−+−
−+−+−= θθθθθ
θθθθ         (11) 
]1))1(²(²[
)1()2(²*
nnb
any ++−+−
−−= θθθθθ
θθ
                            (12) 
 
Condition (8) gives the equilibrium intermediate price r*( θθ , ) and condition 
(4) the equilibrium final price p*( θθ , ). We have here the complete characterization 
of horizontal equilibrium which is necessary to describe vertical equilibrium. 
  
4. Vertical equilibrium 
Vertical equilibrium defines the stage of production in which agents will choose to 
operate. It is assumed that the firm with index θ   is indifferent between operating as a 
downstream firm or being integrated, both of which being more profitable than 
producing only the intermediate good. Similarly, the firm with index θ  is indifferent 
between being specialized in the upstream production or being integrated, both of 
which being more profitable than operating as a downstream firm. Determining these 
boundaries will thus tell us which firms will choose to specialize downstream 
( θθ < ), which firms will maximize their profit while being integrated ( θθθ << ) 
and which firms will specialize upstream ( θθ > ).  
Given the horizontal equilibrium, we examine the firms profits at each index 
for each stage to characterize this vertical equilibrium. These profit functions are : 
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  f
n
yrpd .
.
*).1**(),;( θθθθθπ −−−=       (13) 
 θ
ϕθθθθπ −−−= f
b
pi )²2(),;(      (14) 
  θ
ϕ
θθθθπ −+
−=
)1/1(
)²1(),;(
nb
ru     (15) 
The boundaries θ * and *θ  are defined by conditions (16) and (17)6. 
 
*)*,*;( θθθπ u = *)*,*;( θθθπ i     (16) 
*)*,*;( θθθπ i  = *)*,*;( θθθπ d     (17) 
 
A full vertical equilibrium exists if 0 < θ * < *θ  < 1. There can be no 
integrated firm (θ * = *θ ) or only integrated firms in equilibrium (θ * = 0 et *θ  = 
1), but these cases are not interesting for our problem which is to test Stigler's idea.  
 
Finally, to define the vertical equilibrium, we need to solve the simultaneous 
equations system (4), (8), (11), (12), (16) and (17). Analytical comparative statics on 
the vertical equilibrium are intractable, so we do numerical comparative statics over a 
wide range of values for market size parameters.  
 
5.   Vertical equilibria and industry growth 
The purpose of this model of vertical equilibrium is to test the Stigler's hypothesis 
according to which growing industries would be characterized by vertical 
disintegration, and, conversely, declining industries would be characterized by 
vertical integration. We will thus evaluate the impact on the vertical equilibrium of 
modifications in the value of the model's parameters that are correlated with market 
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size. Industry growth can of course be captured by changing the demand parameters a 
and b. However, on the supply size, it is important to evaluate the impact of an 
increase in the total number of firms n that can come with demand growth.  
We focus only upon the cases where there is a full vertical equilibrium, i.e 
where three types of firms exist. We consider consistent (relative at the marginal 
costs and at the demand size) values for fixed costs7  : we posit f = 40 and ϕ = 10.  
 
5.1 INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF FIRMS 
 
The increase in the number of firms in the industry is accompanied by a fall of the 
relative and absolute number of integrated firms. The integrated stage contracts from 
above and below (see table 1).  
A rise in the total number of firms generates an additional competition on each 
stage that lowers oligopoly markups and increases supplied quantities8  for the three 
types of firms (with Cournot conjecture). The subsequent increase in intermediate 
demand works in the opposite direction for upstream markups but, in our model, the 
former effect is stronger than the latter. We checked by simulation that the final and 
intermediate prices drop and that total output increases with a growing number of 
firms. The integrated firms close to old equilibrium boundary θ * specialize 
downstream (rise in θ ) to benefit from the fall in intermediate price. Those close to 
old equilibrium boundary θ * give up downstream technology (decrease in θ ) 
                                                                                                                                           
6 We can well observe a rise of πu and a fall of πd when θ increase ; the simulation shows us that πi is 
higher than πu and πd for firms with θ near 0.5 for a wide range of the parameters. 
7A rise in the fixed costs for downstream technology leads to a vertical equilibrium for which the 
number of downstream firms decreases but especially for which the number of integrated firms very 
strongly falls ; this can be explained by the fact that the integrated firms have a higher fixed cost for 
downstream technology (because their index θ is higher). A rise in ϕ affect identically integrated firms 
and upstream firms (thus θ  does not change) but does not affect downstream firms, which increases 
the incentive to specialize downstream (rise of θ ).   
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8 The integrated firms are indeed in competition with the downstream firms, therefore even their 
number falls, the number of their competitors increases (cf table 1).  
because of the decreasing downstream markup and of the increased intermediate 
demand. Integrated stage disappears if total number of firms becomes large enough. 
 
Table I : Increasing the number of firms (with β = 0.02, α =2, I =25) 
 
n 10 15 20 25 30 35 
θ  0.15 0.23 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.37 
θ  0.93 0.77 0.66 0.59 0.53 0.49 
Integrated Firms (share) 78% 54% 37% 27% 18% 12% 
Downstream F (share) 15% 23% 29% 32% 35% 37% 
Upstream F (share) 7% 23% 34% 41% 47% 51% 
 
 
So with the additional competition on each stage when the number of firms 
rise, it becomes less advantageous to be vertically integrated to escape double 
marginalization. The firms will have a growing interest to specialize according to 
"their comparative advantage" in terms of skills. This is an interesting preliminary 
result, but an increase in the number of firms cannot be regarded as a reliable 
indicator of the market size. It is the rise in the number of consumers and/or in the 
value which they grant to the product, which leads to industry growth. 
 
5.2.   GROWTH IN THE NUMBER OF CONSUMERS 
By fixing the demand parameters β and α , and the number N of firms, we examine 
industry growth which occurs by increasing number of consumers I (Table 2). 
With the rise of the number of consumers, the slopes of the direct and derived 
inverse demand curves decrease, the produced quantities x and y increase in the same 
proportion, but the prices p and r are not modified firstly (because demand is linear). 
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Thus, the rise in the proportion of integrated firms does not come initially from an 
increase in the upstream oligopoly margin. If we look, on the other hand,  at the profit 
functions of the three types of firms, we observe that a increase in the number of 
consumers induces a stronger rise of profit for integrated firms than for upstream and 
downstream firms. This results of the higher fixed costs in the integrated firms than in 
specialized firms. Actually, if the production scale increases and when marginal costs 
are constant, the profit increase is stronger for firms with higher fixed costs. 
 
Table II : Growth in the number of consumers (with β = 0.02, α =2 , n = 15) 
 
I 5 10 15 25 40 60 
θ  0.30 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.15
θ  0.49 0.61 0.70 0.81 0.91 0.97
Integrated firms (share) 18% 34% 46% 61% 72% 82%
Downstream F (share) 30% 27% 24% 21% 19% 15%
Upstream F (share) 52% 39% 30% 18% 9% 3% 
  
If it is this scale effect which explains the initial increase in the proportion of 
integrated firms, this tendency induces modifications of the competing situation for 
each stage that will impact on final equilibrium. Indeed, the subsequent fall in the 
number of upstream firms is accompanied by a rise in the oligopoly markup and thus 
induces downstream firms near to the old equilibrium boundary θ * to integrate 
upstream technology. But on the other hand, the decrease in the number of 
independent downstream firms (accentuated by the former effect) tends to lower their 
intermediate demand. This moderates the increase in the oligopoly price. We verified 
by simulation, that the first effect is stronger than the second. 
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 Proposition 1 : A growing number of consumers leads to an increasing proportion 
of firms choosing to be vertically integrated.  
 
This result comes however partly from the scale effect. To cancel this effect 
and to focus on the strategic behaviors, we next consider that the number of 
consumers and the number of firms increase proportionately.  
 
5.3. PROPORTIONAL GROWTH IN THE NUMBER OF CONSUMERS AND FIRMS 
 
The results are reversed if the number of firms increases proportionately with the 
growth in the number of consumers. We do it by fixing n/I as I increases, which 
implies a constant average individual output for each firm9 (Table III). 
 The decrease occurs both from integrated firms specializing upstream and 
downstream10. This means, in first analysis, that the impact from increasing the 
number of firms (which lowers markups) overrides the impact of increasing the 
number of consumers. This can be interpreted as follows. By assuming a proportional 
growth, "the scale effect" for each firm is cancelled, so the "competition effect" 
dominates : the rise of the industry size induces a rise of competition, therefore a 
decrease in the markups (despite the demand growth) and finally a growing 
specialization (see 5.1). 
 
Table III : Proportional growth in the number of consumers and firms11  
(with β = 0.02, α =2, and  n/I = 0.6) 
 
                                                 
9 Because the average individual output for each firm can be written : pnInI )./()/( βα −=q  
10 We checked that it is also accompanied by a drop in intermediate and final prices. 
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n 6 12 18 30 42 60 78 
I 10 20 30 50 70 100 130
θ  0.09 0.18 0.24 0.31 0.36 0.4 0.43
θ  0.98 0.85 0.78 0.70 0.66 0.6 0.56
Integrated firms (share) 90% 68% 54% 39% 30% 20% 13%
Downstream F (share) 8% 17% 24% 31% 36% 40% 43%
Upstream F (share) 2% 15% 22% 30% 34% 40% 44%
 
Proposition 2 : A proportional growth in the number of consumers and firms leads 
to an increasing proportion of firms choosing to be vertically integrated. 
 
However, we can’t assert that the number of consumers and the number of 
producers are positively correlated, particularly in a model where average costs are 
continuously decreasing. So we can't clearly conclude on the validation of Stigler's 
thesis at this stage. 
 
5.4 GROWTH IN THE DEMAND PRICE 
 
Another way of considering demand growth is to assume an increase in the value 
granted to the final good by each consumer. A rise of α without modification of β  
(equation 4) results in a fall of the consumption's price elasticity and in a rise of 
demand for a given price. Table 4 reveals that it results in a growing number of 
integrated firms.  
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Table IV : Growth in the value to consumers (with β =0.02, I = 25, n = 15). 
 
α 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.8 
θ  0.37 0.34 0.31 0.28 0.23 0.19 0.13 
θ  0.46 0.53 0.6 0.66 0.77 0.86 0.95 
Integrated firms (share) 8% 19% 29% 38% 54% 67% 82% 
Downstream F (share) 38% 34% 31% 28% 23% 19% 13% 
Upstream F (share) 54% 47% 40% 34% 23% 14% 5% 
 
The explanation of this correlation is partly the same as in the case of a rise of the 
number of consumers I (high fixed cost for integrated firms) but not only. A rise of α 
results here indeed in an increased final price, and also in an increased intermediate 
price, because oligopoly markups increase on each stage. Downstream firms benefit 
as well as the integrated firms from the growth in the value to consumers through the 
rise in the final price and quantities ; but they also face the rise in the intermediate 
price. Thus, they will not benefit as much as the integrated firms from the rise of α. 
Those that are close to θ  will be incited to integrate the upstream stage to catch the 
markup. This induces a decrease in the derived demand for the intermediate input 
which make it profitable for upstream firms near θ  to integrate forward. This 
tendency is reinforced by the fact that upstream firms benefit only partly, like the 
downstream firms, of the rise of α. They can catch downstream markup while 
integrating forward. 
 
Proposition 3 : A growth in the value the consumers grant to the final product 
results in an increasing proportion of firms choosing to be vertically integrated. 
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A real problem of double marginalization appears here : specialized firms on each 
stage choose prices and quantities without considering the impact on the profits of the 
other stage firms. By eliminating the double marginalization, vertical integration 
greatly modifies the structure of the intermediate market and thus the margins of the 
specialized firms. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper has examined, in a model of successive Cournot oligopolies, how a 
modification of the market size could impact on the degree of vertical integration in 
an industry. This model differs from most of vertical equilibrium models because it 
introduces explicitly the benefits of vertical disintegration which derive from 
differences between the firms in their efficiency in producing intermediate and final 
goods. Vertical integration is motivated by the double mark-up effect. Given a linear 
final demand, we can then define a vertical equilibrium where firms choose to operate 
on one or both of the two stages according to their skills. This equilibrium is affected 
by industry growth. If industry growth is defined as an increase in the value granted 
to the final good, then the net impact of growth is a higher proportion of vertically 
integrated firms, because of the subsequent higher mark-ups on each stage. The net 
impact is the same if industry growth is defined as an increase in the number of 
consumers, because integrated firms with higher fixed costs benefit more from the 
rising production scale. However, the result is reversed if we suppose, in order to 
cancel the scale effect, a proportional increase in the number of firms and consumers. 
A lower proportion of firms choose to integrate both stages, because of the 
diminishing impact of double mark-up effect when the number of firms increases. So, 
only one case of demand growth conforms to Stigler's hypothesis of positive 
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correlation between industrial specialization and industry growth in our two stages 
model with Cournot competition. 
Finally this model can also contribute to research on the effect of vertical 
integration on the final price (and on the consumer's surplus) in the context of 
successive oligopolies. In our model, an increase in the proportion of integrated firms 
induces ceteris paribus a decrease in the final price. 
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